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Summary  findings
Developing countries have been quite successful at  resour-es that exist have not always been efficiently
expanding school enrollment, especially at lower levels.  utilized. Most notably, the student-teacher  ratio has risen
But for any given level of educational efficiency,  dramatically over the past decade. In addition, while
increased enrollments require increased resources, in  many new schools hlave  been started, many of them do
order to maintain qualitv. If those resources are not  not have buildings, or have  only meager buildings. The
forthcominig, the increase in educatiotnal quantity may  qualit'  of ediucation, as mneastired  by the pass rate on the
come at the expense of educational quality.  state" ide tenth grade examination, has suffered as a
When public budgets are constrained, is there a  result  The study shows that the rise in the student-
tradeoff between quantity and quality of education? If  teacher ratio and the consequent diminution of the
so, what public policies can diminish the decline in  growth rate in examination passes has been greatest in
quality?  distri, ts with the fastest enrollment growth - evidence
Duraisamy, James, Lane, and Tan find a negative effect  of a quantity,-quality tradeoff.
of expanded enrollments on school conditions and  Districts with a high proportion  of privately-nianaged
learning, using a cross-district time series analysis of  schools perform better.  Policy changes such as greater
Tamil Nadu, [ndia. A wide arrav of initiatives  use o, private managemiient  and finanice  and greater local
undertaken  by the governmenit  of Tamil Nadu has made  discrr  tion in publicly-managed schools imlight improve
schools accessible and attractive to families. But the  the situation.
resources have not kept up with enrollnients and those
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Evidence from Tamil Nadu, India
Expanding access to education, especially at lower levels, is a common
objective  of  governments  in  developing  countries,  and  it  has  met  with
considerable success over the last two decades  (see,  for example, UNESCO 1993;
World Bank 1995)  . But for any given level of efficiency, increased enrollments
require increased resources, in order to maintain quality.  Countries may not
always take this into account in their educational plans.  Does the increase in
educational quantity come at the expense of quality?  What public policies can
raise efficiency or otherwise diminish this quantity-quality trade-off, in the
face of strong constraints on  public budgets?  This  paper explores these issues,
using Tamil Nadu, India, as a case in point.
We document the sustained and rapid increases in  enrollments in  Tamil Nadu
since  the  1970s,  in part  due  to  state government  policies.  However,  the
expansion has not been an unmitigated success.  Because the education system  has
always depended heavily on public funding, and because these resources did not
keep up with enrollments, conditions of schooling, particularly teacher-pupil
ratios at the middle and secondary levels, declined sharply.  We investigate
whether this  in turn has  had a negative  impact on academic performance,  as
measured by the pass rate on the tenth grade examination.
The limited role that the private sector has been allowed to play has
exacerbated the conflict  between  educational  quantity  and quality.  In  Tamil  Nadu
many schools--21 per cent at the primary-middle levels and 28 per cent at the
secondary level--are "aided",  that is, set up and run by private management but
largely  financed by  the state, hence a public-private  hybrid.  While  their
teacher salaries are paid by the state, the  managers are expected to provide the
building and other school facilities.  In exchange for public funding they give
up the right to charge fees,  but they retain  other  managerial rights, such  as the
right to select their teachers.  Fewer than 1 per cent of schools are private,
unaided  and  fee-financed.  Therefore, as  a  secondary question,  this paper
1analyzes whether quality might be raised by expanding the number of privately-
managed schools and by using private finance to loosen the resource constraint
for the system as a whole.
We utilize two sources of information: evidence based on aggregate time
series  data at  the  district level,  drawn  from (mostly  unpublished) administrative
records kept by Tamil Nadu's Department of Education; and evidence based on a
field trip to 26 government and private schools in rural and urban areas around
Madras and Madurai by three of the authors in July 1994.1  These visits offered
an opportunity for discussion with school heads and teachers and for first-hand
observation of actual school conditions.  These diverse sources of information
led  us to conclude that  Tamil Nadu was  not willing or able to  maintain a constant
level of public per student funding as enrollments rose through the 1980's, so
school conditions, and to some extent learning, fell.
Part I  asks, what  were the  consequences  of increased  enrollments for  school
conditions?  Part II analyzes the impact on learning, as measured by the growth
rate of passes on the 10th  grade examination, and evaluates whether this effect
differs across districts depending on their  use of private management.  Part III
considers  whether  greater  reliance  on  private  finance  might  improve  the
situation.  The Conclusion summarizes policy implications.
I. The Impact of Increasing Enrollments on School Conditions
During the  past two  decades the Tamil  Nadu government has adopted numerous
measures designed to increase enrollments: setting up a primary school in every
village with more than 1,000 inhabitants (the  threshold is  now being lowered to
500 inhabitants); providing free  mid-day meals 365 days a  year to every child in
primary and middle school; and giving free  uniforms and books to every child in
Although  we  had  a  general  letter  of  introduction  from  the  state
government,  these visits were not announced beforehand. The choice of
schools to  visit was random in the sense that  we stopped at the schools we
happened upon along our route; in some places we also asked local people
for directions to particular types of schools  (e.g. public or private
aided or private unaided) we wished to see.  No school denied us a visit.
2the  mid-day  meal  program. 2 Some  measures  specifically  encourage  girls'
schooling: special "marriage  grants" to  those  who complete 8th  grade; cash awards
to headmasters who enroll and retain high proportions of girls from scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes; hiring of large proportions of women teachers; and
since 1.991,  stipulating that only women can be hired as new teachers in primary
schools.  Considerable publicity has been given to the importance of education
and literacy,  backed  up by awards to  communities  that achieve  high enrollment  and
school completion rates (see  Govt. of Tamil Nadu, India 1994 for details on the
various initiatives).
That the school system has expanded rapidly  during the  past two decades is
apparent from the data in Table 1.  Although the network of primary schools was
already relatively developed in 1977 it  continued to grow, adding another 2,700
schools by 1992.  The gross enrollment ratio at the primary level rose from 93
percent in 1977 to 101 percent by 1992, suggesting nearly universal attendance
among  recent cohorts of  primary school-age  children. Coverage  also took  off  after
the mid-1970s at the middle school level, followed a decade later by a similar
trend at the high school and higher secondary school levels.  Thus between 1977
and 1992 age enrollment ratios rose from 57 percent to 96 percent at the middle
school level and from 33 percent to 47 percent at the high school and higher
secondary levels. 3 The female share of enrollments increased at all levels. The
2  The mid-day meal program was initially intended only for children from
low-income families.  It is  now open to everyone,  but children from higher
income households self-select themselves out of  the program.  Besides
meeting the recipients' nutritional needs, the meals can be viewed as a
payment  to  families  to  cover  the  opportunity  cost of  schooling.  The
uniforms provided do not always fit and are not always worn, but they do
reduce the private cost of schooling to low-income families.
3  Our data on age enrollment ratios are based on actual grades in which
students are enrolled divided by size of population in the relevant age
group. However, our data on number of students and teachers are based on
category of school in which students are enrolled. Schools in Tamil Nadu
are categorized according to the  highest grade that they offer. Since some
middle  schools began to offer  higher grades during  this period,  they
became recategorized as high schools, and since many students in middle
school grades attended schools categorized  as high schools, the growth in
high schools and high school students appears much larger than the growth
in age enrollment ratios at the high school level, and vice versa at the
middle school level. The age enrollment data give the better picture of
enrollment coverage for each group of potential students. See Table 1 for
3Appendix presents evidence on the degree to which this enrollment expansion was
due to state policies versus exogenous family circumstances.
The focus of this stuidy  is the degree to which these enrollment increases
were accompanied by worsening conditions of schooling, and the consequences of
this deterioration, as public spending on education, particularly on teaching
resources and physical facilities, did not keep up with the growth in student
numbers.
Teachers and class time
While enrollments at the primary and middle school levels expanded by 35
percent between 1977 and 1992, the number of teachers increased only 4 percent
in the same period.  Inevitably, the ratio of pupils to teachers rose--from 36
in 1977 to 47 in 1992 (Table  2).  By 1992, pupil-teacher ratios in primary and
middle schools across districts ranged between 39 and 54.
At the high school and higher secondary levels the pattern of growth in
numbers of pupils and teachers was even more striking (Table  3).  Between 1977
and 1992, enrollments rose by 139 percent, reflecting substantial increases in
conitinuation  rates  to secondary  education,  while the  number of teachers  grew  only
44 per  cent.  Consequently, the pupil-teacher ratio rose from 25 to 42, an
increase of 66 percent.  On average, for every 1 percentage point increase in
number of students since 1977, there was only a 0.11 percentage point increase
in number  of  teachers  at  the primary  and middle  school  levels  and  a  0.32
percentage point increase  at the high  school  and higher secondary levels. At all
levels, pupil-teacher ratios in Tamil Nadu are among the highest in the world
today (see  UNESCO 1993 for data on other countries).
The rising pupil-teacher ratio has been exacerbated by the differential
rate of enrollment growth across districts and the fact that teacher allocation
has not responded to these differences, so districts with the fastest growing
enrollments also had the fastest rising pupil-teacher ratios  (Table 3)  . For
example, enrollments in primary and middle schools increased 44 per  cent in
Chengalpattu district between 1977  and 1992,  compared with 25 per cent in Salem.
further explanation.
4But  the  number  of  teachers  increased  at  almost  the  same  rate  in  these  2
districts--5 and 4  per cent, respectively.  As a result, the pupil-teacher ratio
rose 37 per cent in the former, ending up at 51, while it rose only 19 in the
latter, ending up at 45.  Between 1977 and 1992, secondary school enrollments
more than tripled in Dharmapuri but less than doubled in Kanniyakumari, while
teachers grew at the same rate--about 54 per cent--in both districts.  As a
result. the pupil-teacher ratio more than doubled in Dharmapuri, to 50, but it
grew only 25 per cent, to 32, in Kanniyakumari. In this paper we exploit these
district differences, which  become the basis for the regression  analysis that is
described in the next section.
One reason for the slow growth in number of teachers is the fact that the
salary scale for government-paid teachers is far above the market rate (in  some
private unaided schools that we visited, teachers were paid only one-quarter as
much as government-paid teachers),  and that  cost-of-living  adjustments are built
into the salary scale.  Thus, most of the increase in available public funding
has  gone to a relatively constant number of teachers in the form of salaries and
salary increases, rather than to a larger number of teachers.
High pupil-teacher ratios mean that students attend classes in very large
groups.  In some districts visited by the authors, groups of 60 to 100 students
are  commonplace.  In  secondary  schools  teaching  resources  are  especially
constrained because  teachers work only  24 periods  (18 hours)  a week, while
students are present  for 34 periods.  Thus, the nominal pupil-teacher  ratio
overstates the effective class size by about 40 percent.  For example, if there
is one teacher for every 50 pupils, the average class size would be 70, not 50,
because each teacher only teaches for 70 percent of the full day.
The sparseness of teaching resources per student is compounded by other
factors that reduce effective teaching time, such as:
0  The slowness to  fill  teaching vacancies when they occur  due  to  retirement
or  transfer.  Headmasters  in public  schools  do not  have  the  authority  to
hire but must wait for the  Recruitment Board in  Madras (the  state capital)
to  send  replacements.  This  process  can  take  a  year  or  longer,
5particularly during periods of budget stringency at  the state level.  many
of the schools we visited had at least one vacant position.
0  The lack of substitute  teachers to cover for absent  teachers.  When a
teacher is absent, the class (of 50-100 students) is merged with another
class or sits by it:self. Teachers are eligible for 14  days of "casual
leave" annually, which is 6.5 percent of the school year.  In addition, a
3-month paid maternity  leave is allowed, as well as 18 months of sick
leave over a teacher's career (which  teachers usually take toward the end
if they haven't already used it up earlier).  Thus, one can expect a
career teacher who works for 30  years, has 3 children and takes full sick
leave and "casual leave" (as  most do) to be absent an average of 34 days
a year, or 16 percent of total school time.  At most schools visited by
the authors, the rate of absenteeism plus vacancies ranged between 10 and
20 percent.
*  The participation of teachers in non-teachingr  activities.  Teachers are
expected to perform numerous other duties which cut into teaching time.
For example, they are expected to  help collect  data for the census, assist
in elections, and show up for in-service training.  Other non-teaching
activities cause teachers to arrive late or depart early, and additional
tir.ie  is lost to teacher strikes and political agitation.  In 1993, for
example, public school teachers were on strike for 2 months, and schools
simply closed during that time.
Privately-managed aided schools seem  to have an advantage in  retaining and
utilizing the services of their teachers.  First of all, their managers choose
their teachers and can select  people they judge  to  be conscientious, rather than
simply  accepting teachers  who are  assigned  by  madras; at least  in  principle, they
can also fire ineffective teachers.  Second, when a teacher leaves, the vacancy
can be filled immediately at the discretion of the school manager, even though
the state pays the salary.  Thus, aided schools are less likely to have vacant
positions than are public schools.  Third, absent teachers can  be replaced using
resources provided and at salary scales determined by the school's management;
6in our  field visits we  observed fewer missing  teachers and  classes without
teachers in aided schools.  And fourth, teachers in aided schools are likely to
spend less time in out-of-school activities. 4
In sum, the teaching input  per student has been declining, even that small
input is missing over 20 percent of the time, but less so in  privately- than in
publicly-managed schools, and political economy forces that keep public school
teacher  salaries  relatively high  have added  to the problem.  It  is hardly
surprising that rote learning is emphasized under these circumstances, both in
the classroom and in the examinations.  Given the on-going debate about the
importance of resources  versus pedagogical processes, it is  worth noting that to
some  extent  the  latter  is  constrained  by  the  former,  making  pedagogical
improvement difficult in Tamil Nadu.
Buildings and other facilities
The government of Tamil Nadu has been very successful in starting new
schools, so that practically every  village has a primary school and easy access
to a middle  and secondary school as well.  But many of the schools have no
buildings, which means that lessons are held outdoors, on the ground, and are
suspended whenever it rains,  perhaps 5  percent of the time.  This is  yet another
way in  which teaching time is lost.  Even in schools with buildings, the typical
arrangement consists of one large  unfurnished classroom, sometimes divided into
several sections by partial partitions, each section accommodating 50 to 100
students.  Tables and chairs are lacking  and most students sit on the dirt floor
for their lessons.  Most schools we  visited did not  have lavatories.  On average,
40 percent of Tamil Nadu's primary schools in the rural areas have no building
or only one room, and nearly a quarter of the classes lack a blackboard (Table
4).  Many of these ore-room schoolhouses have only one teacher.
It is hardly surprising, given these difficult conditions, that the high
rate of teacher absenteeism is  more than  matched by the students: in some of the
4  In most  of  the aided  schools visited  by  the  authors, conditions  and
discipline were visibly better than those in government schools. All the
private unaided fee-charging  schools visited  were equipped  with tables and
chairs and classes contained fewer than 40 pupils.
7schools visited by the authors, students absenteeism ranged as high as 25-50
percent.  In this sense, the enrollment data overstate the actual number of
students days, by 35-100 percent.  It is perhaps more surprising that students
remained enrolled in school despite these poor and declining conditions  (see
Hanushek and Lavy 1994 for  a study of  enrollments in  Egypt, a case  where students
were found to have dropped out because of poor quality education.)
II.  What Has Been the Impact on Examination Results?
To what extent has the decline in school conditions adversely affected
student learning?  Can policies be adopted that would minimize these adverse
effects, despite the tight public budget constraint? Ideally we would examine
these issues using individual-level time series data on achievement scores and
student characteristics. 5 Such data are unavailable in Tamil Nadu, however, so
we rely on time series district-level data, using the results on the state-wide
tenth grade public examinations as a proxy  for learning outcomes. 6 The many
generic problems with the  use of such an  exam as an  outcome indicator include the
fact that it may measure rote learning rather than analytic skills, and grading
standards may differ across districts and time  periods. In this case examination
papers are  graded centrally,  implying  that  the same  standards  were  applied across
all districts. It is possible that grading standards have changed though time,
thereby raising or depressing the number of passes; however, this effect would
be picked up by the time trend included  in  the regression  analysis and the cross-
district  regression  analysis  presented  below  should  remain  valid.
Bashir  (1994) is a rare example of a study using achievement data for
individual students in Tamil Nadu.  Her study focused on cross-sectional
differences  in achievement outcomes between public and private  schools
rather than on changes in achievement over time. Kingdon (1996)  also uses
individual student data to compare standardised  achievement differentials
between students of private and public schools in Uttar Pradesh.
Students also sit for state-wide examinations at the end of the twelfth
grade.  Because  the available data for these examinations refer  to a
relatively short time series of four years, we focused only on the data
for the tenth grade examination.
8Many recent studies  have shown  that expenditures  per student are  not
a good predictor of school performance  (Hanushek 1986 and 1994), so we might
expect  the  deteriorating  school  conditions  in  Tamil Nadu  to  exert  only  a
negligible adverse on examination results.  But few of the studies pertain to
situations where resource levels are very low and where changes have been as
dramatic as those observed in Tamil Nadu.
Between  1977  and  1992  the  number  of  candidates  for  the  tenth  grade
examinations grew by 73 percent for the state as a whole, from a base of nearly
a quarter million candidates (Table  5).  During the same period the number of
passes rose by 118 percent, lifting the  pass rate from 54 percent in 1977 to 69
percent in 1992.  Much of the improving trend in pass rates reflects the above
average performance of the increasing proportion of female candidates.
These  aggregate patterns  would seem to suggest that the deteriorating
conditions of schools in the state did not hold back examination performance.
But it is also possible that the effect of deteriorating school conditions was
negative and offset by other factors such as secular improvements in parental
education and nutritional status of the children.  In other words, had school
conditions not deteriorated, examination  outcomes might have been better still.
We use  cross-district regression analysis below to estimate how much better
performance would have been.
The model and data
We model growth in tenth grade examination passes as a function of growth
in candidates, changes in schooling conditions as proxied by the pupil-teacher
ratio, the prevalence of privately-managed schools in each district, as well as
a time trend to  proxy systematic changes  over time in, for example, social norms
on schooling, parental education levels, children's nutritional status, labor
market incentives and grading standards on the examinations.  In an alternative
specification we replace the private school variable with district dummies to
capture  all  systematic  differences  across  districts,  including  differences  in  the
distribution of schools  by  management  type. Data limitations  precluded expansion
of the regression models beyond this set of regressors.
9Our data pertain to time series information for 15 districts during 1977
to 1992 culled  from administrative records kept by the Government  of Tamil
Nadu.'  We  transform  each  variable  (enrollments, teachers,  candidates  and
passes) into an index based on its 1977 level, to facilitate comparisons over
time across districts which vary widely in population size.  nD
focal point is the impact  of the  pupil-teacher ratio  on educational performance.
We  note  that  each  cohort's examination performance  reflects  the  cumulative
effects of past schooling conditions.  Because students were exposed to middle
school conditions for three years but high school conditions for only one year
before taking the  examination,  we use the  pupil-teacher ratio for middle school
(grades  6-8), appropriately lagged, for each  year of examination data.  For the
reasons elaborated earlier we expect this variable to have a negative effect on
learning.
As  an  indicator of the prevalence  of private management, we used  the
percentage of private aided schools in the district.  We expect this to have a
positive effect, in light of the greater flexibility that private schools have
in Tamil Nadu  (see  above), as well as findings from recent studies suggesting
that  privately-managed schools  achieve  greater  efficiency  or  academic  value-added
than  publicly-managed  schools  (Jimenez and  Lockheed  1995;  James,  King  and
Suriyadi.,1996).  This  positive measured effect  may occur  because decision-making
in privately-managed schools is less bureaucratized, more localized, closer to
the locus of information about school  processes (a  true value-added), but it  may
The time series refer to the following years:  1977, 1980, 1983, 1986,
1988, 1989,  1990, 1992.  Data  for the more  recent years  refer to  23
districts,  some  of  which  existed  previously  as  combined  districts.
Because the data for earlier  years are  available only for 15  districts, we
amalgamated the data for  the newly created  districts to produce a complete
time series for 15 districts for our analysis.  The available data show
the number of students and teachers in primary, middle, high and higher
secondary schools.  Because many schools offer the full range of grades,
from kindergarten to higher secondary grades, the data do not correspond
exactly to a breakdown by grade or cycle of education.  For example, a
child attending the primary wing of a high school is counted as a high
school student in this data set.  To minimize the effect of this problem
in  our  calculation  of  student/teacher  ratios,  we  use  the  same
classification system for teachers.  The data contain information on the
composition of schools by type of management, as well as the number of
candidates taking and passing the state-wide public examinations at the
end of the tenth grade.
10also be an artifact of an unobserved selection process in which private schools
attract students with higher ability and motivation and weed out the others. In
this  analysis, which  uses district  pass rates  and  district  proportions of  private
schools,  selection  bias  is  minimized  because  it  can  only  operate  through
attracting better students from other  districts, or getting students to drop out
of any school in the district before they become candidates.
In  Tamil  Nadu the share  of schools  that  are privately-managed  varies widely
across districts but has remained relatively stable within each district in the
period under analysis  (see Appendix Table 3).  As a result the variable for
private schools is almost collinear with the district dummies, and we could not
use it together with the district dummies in the same regression.  District
dummies capture the influence of private management as well as that of other
factors such as the increased number of students from disadvantaged backgrounds
who reach  the tenth grade,  sit for the exam, and ultimately  fail, possible
differences in grading standards across districts (unlikely, as noted above),
variation in social norms and so on.  Note that to the extent that these effects
are  uniform across  villages, they  will  be picked up  by the time trend rather than
the district dummies.  Because the  district dummies capture managerial capacity
plus a wide range of other effects, they should have greater predictive power
than managerial type alone, although with less specificity about the forces at
work.
We control for growth in the number of candidates over this period, which
would normally have a strong positive effect on the growth in  number of passes.
Ideally we would have used the  growth in  number of ninth grade students, instead
of carndidates  for the examination, as the independent variable for predicting
growth in examination passes.  This would minimize the effect of selection bias
associated  with  the  likelihood that  schools encourage only  better prepared
students to sit for the examinations, an effect that may differ across villages
11and time.  However, information  on enrollment  by  grade was  not available so  number
of candidates was used. 8
In a separate equation we explain growth in number of candidates as a
function  of growth in  enrollments at  the  high school  and higher secondary levels,
the  prevalence  of  privately-managed  schools  (or,  alternatively,  district
dummies),  and  a time  trend.
The rosults
The regression results appear in  Table 6.  Not surprisingly, the growth in
passes  at  the  tenth  grade  examinations  depends  mainly  on  the  growth  in
examination candidates: a 1 percentage point increase in candidates results in
a 0.99 percentage point increase in examination passes  (all  relative to 1977).
The growth of candidates, in turn, is a function of the growth in enrollments:
a 1  percentage point increase in upper school enrollments  (i.e.  in high school
and  higher  secondary  school) produces  a  0.72 percentage  point  increase  in
candidates.  These results suggest that policies aimed at getting students into
school and keeping them there will have the most powerful effect on the stock of
examination passes.
Most important for our purposes, pupil-teacher ratios do indeed exert a
negative influence on  examination passes:  holding number  of candidates  constant,
every additional pupil in the class held back the growth in passes by 1.2-1.5
percentage points, depending  on specification. Between 1977  and 1992,  the  state-
wide average middle school  pupil-teacher ratio rose  by 12  pupils, from 35 to 47.
According to our regression estimates, the number of passes on the tenth grade
examinations  in 1992, relative to the number in 1977, would have been 15-18
percentage points higher if the 1977 pupil-teacher ratio had been maintained.
Because students attending grade 9 are spread across institutions which
are  labelled as middle, high, and higher secondary schools, it is not
possible to compare the number of candidates directly to the number of
ninth grade students. The  number of candidates  grew  much slower (73%)  than
enrollments at the high and higher secondary levels  (139%)  . This was
partly due to the fact that enrollments categorized as secondary in fact
included an increasing number of students who were actually sitting in
middle school grades.  It may also have been due partially to increased
selectivity in continuation from middle to high school grades or in exam
takers among those attending high school grades.  The available data do
not enable us to disentangle these explanations. Also see footnote 3.
12That implies the  percentage of candidates  passing the examination in 1992 would
have been 73 percent instead of 68 percent (see  Figure 1).
As  noted  above  the  pupil-teacher  ratio  is  subject  to  substantial
measurement errors, implying that its regression coefficient is likely to be
biased downward in  absolute value.  In  addition, if increased  selection occurred
in districts with high and rising pupil-teacher ratios, this too would have
biased downward its coefficient.  Offsetting\these two negative biases is the
positive bias stemming from the possibility that districts with rapidly rising
enrollments and  pupil-teacher  ratios  are  recruiting  students  from  less  privileged
backgrounds,  where accumulation of human capital in the household is lower.
Unfortunately, we do not have the data that would be needed  to test for or
eliminate these possible biases.  On balance, the available evidence implies that
enrollment  growth has  had the primary impact  of increasing the  number  of students
who take and pass the exam,  but the concomitant  decline in school conditions, as
reflected  in dramatically  rising pupil-teacher  ratios, has  had  a partially
counteracting negative effect on student performance.
Also as expected, the distribution of schools by management type affects
performance across districts: a 1 percentage point rise in the proportion of
aided schools increases the growth rate of passes by 0.22 percentage point.
Thus, if we compare Periyar-Coimbatore, where 29.5 per cent of the secondary
schools are  privately-managed aided  or unaided,  with Pudukottai, where only 13.5
per cent are in this category, the expected  number of examination passes in each
year relative to 1977  would be 3.5 percentage points higher in Periyar, ceteris
paribus.  If this is true value-added, it suggests that some practices of aided
schools,  such  as the  right to  select their own  teachers  (subject to  state
standards), to hire substitute teachers  and to fill  vacancies expeditiously, may
contribute to their effectiveness and should also  be extended to  public schools.
Over-all, our regression results suggest that there is a quantity-quality
trade-off if public budgets are constrained, and policies aimed at improving
efficiency through choice of managerial type will improve examination outcomes
as enrollments increase.
13III.  How  Can  Private  Resources  Augment  Public  Resources?
The decline in school conditions,  with its  adverse effects on achievement,
arises in part because the education system in Tamil Nadu depends predominantly
upon government funding and government funding has become increasingly scarce.
Until  recently,  the state government did not permit  augmentation by private
resources.  Fees were not allowed in public or aided schools and even voluntary
contributions were prohibited.
These  restrictions are  found in many  countries in public  and private
subsidized schools, as a condition for government aid  (James 1991)  . In most
cases  the  ostensible rationale  for  prohibiting fees  and contributions  is  equity--
wealthier families or communities  should not  be allowed to secure better quality
education for their children by paying.  A related political economy rationale
is that many low and middle-income families do not have a high effective demand
(i.e.  a willingness to pay) for incremental quality, do not want the market to
push up  the price  of schooling for them, and do not want  others to gain  a
competitive  advantage in the labor market by attending schools that provide
better quality through private finance.  Their political clout results in the
restrictions on  fees and contributions  (see James 1993, for a more  rigorous
cross-country  analysis  of  the  nolitical  economy  of government  spending  on
education).
At  the same time, above-market  salary scales have  often been set  for
government-paid teachers,  who are  a well-organized  politically articulate  group.
In Tamil Nadu, as we  have seen, the result was a resource base that failed to
keep pace with enrollment growth, with most of the monetary increase going to
teachers in the form of higher wages.
One way out of this situation is to increase  public spending  on education.
But in many cases the inability to pay on the part of low income  groups, and the
unwillingness of high income groups to subsidize them, limits the political
feasibility of this option.  Another way out is to tap private resources and to
allow these resources to  be used to  hire additional  teachers through the private
14market.  This increases the total resources used for education and may also
increase  the efficiency with which these resources  are transformed into academic
outputs (James  and King 1996,  Jineniez  and Paqueo 1996)  . In  recent  years, perhaps
because school conditions have n1ow  sunk so low that middle class support has
shifted, the government has indeed begun to institute such policies.
For example, fee-charging  schools  are  now  permitted to  open freely,  and the
number of  publicly financed  aided  schools is  no longer  expanding.  "Matriculation
schools",  which are  self-financed  English-medium  schools,  are  by far  the  fastest-
growing part of the education sector.  Privately-financed unregistered schools
have also been growing, especially at the primary level.  These avoid the high
costs of registration, which requires  posting a bond.  Their students switch to
recognized matriculation schools at grade 6, when attending a recognized school
becomes more important.
The  government  has  also  introduced  measures  to  mobilize  private
contributions in publicly financed schools, effectively lifting a previous ban
on such contributions.  Among the new policies:
3  Parent-teacher and mother-teacher organizations have been set up in each
school, and donations of up to 25 rupees per family are encouraged.  For
a school with 1,000 students, the yield would be 25,000 rupees a year,
enough to pay for 2 or 3 additional teachers.
- Schools can collect donations from private benefactors under the "School
Improvement Conference."  Donors who contribute 1,000 rupees or more are
honored  as  school patrons, and  their contributions are put  into bank
accounts whose interest can be spent by the school.  In-kind donations of
furniture and materials are also encouraged.  These two measures will
increase the discretionary funds and consequently the managerial control
of some public schools.
*  Using  these  funds,  retired  or  unemployed  teachers  can  be  hired  to
substitute for permanent teachers on leave or for absent teachers, for
"honoraria" that are only a small fraction of the regular pay  scales.
Unemployed teachers are encouraged to participate by giving them credit
15for this experience when they apply for a permanent job.  This is  a way of
overcoming the  relatively  high  permanent salary scales  for  government-paid
teachers.
•  Government and aided schools are required to charge fees for English-
medium instruction,  which is  'rery  popular.  In  government schools the fees
must be turned over to the public treasury.  It  remains to  be seen whether
the revenue will be plowed back into education and whether government
schools will have the incentive to start these streams.
*  Aided schools are permitted to start an English-medium stream on a self-
financing basis.  The stream would use the school facilities as a second
shift, thereby obtaining  more intensive  use of capital, and teachers would
be paid out of fees.
*  Still missing are more  far-reaching changes that would  give publicly-
managed schools control over  the selection  of their teachers and the right
to hire substitutes and fill vacancies without waiting for Madras to act.
This two-pronged policy  adopted by  the government--allowing more  fee-
financed private  schools  to operate and mobilizing private  contributions in
government-financed schools--has the potential to arrest the deterioration in
school conditions.  Presumably  parents are willing to  pay fees and  contributions
only if they feel the value of the quality improvement exceeds the cost.  If
parents have the information to make this evaluation reasonably well, and if
public  spending  is not  cut back  further,  these policies may  raise average
educational quality.
IV.  Conclusion
What can  other countries learn from  the Tamil  Nadu experience?  Government
policies that make schools accessible can increase enrollments, and this is a
first major step toward increasing academic achievement.  However, if public
resources do not increase with student numbers, school conditions and academic
achievement will suffer.  In many cases governments do not take this cost into
16account,  resulting  in  large  increases in  the pupil-teacher  ratio  that  are
detrimental to learning. In.  the face of tight budget constraints, there is a
quantity-quality  trade-off.  This trade-off can be minimized by giving  more
discretion over resource use to publicly-managed schools, permitting privately-
managed  schools to develop and increasing private finance both in public and
private schools.
But any system that permits variability in finance and management is also
likely tc benefit disproportionately those groups that were more advantaged to
begin with, and are therefore in  a better position to  pay and to choose the best
management.  Thus, the same measures that improve average quality will also
increase disparities in quality, unless counter-acting actions are taken by the
state, such as reallocating public funds to  poorer districts where families are
less able  to provide  private  finance.  Such reallocation is limited by the
unwillingness of  higher income  groups to  redistribute  and  by the  possibility that
it will  create a disincentive for communities to generate their own private
funds.  It is especially limited in the short-run because it depends on the
redeployment of teachers who are already on the payroll.  It will be a challenge
for Tamil Nadu  to devise mechanisms  for constraining the  inequalities that
develop, as it adopts policies designed to increase quality over-all and reduce
the quantity-quality trade-off in the face of rapid educational expansion.
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18Appendix: Did State Policies Increase Enrollments?
To what extent is the success in expanding enrollments due to variables
associated  with individual  families,  such  as the  income  and  education of  parents,
and to what extent is it due to policy variables such as the decision of the
state government to  make schooling  more accessible?  The National Sample Survey
(NSS)  of households in 1986-87 throws light on this question, by enabling us to
determine  what factors influenced  household  decisions regarding the  education of
their children.
9
The model and data
We use households rather than individual children as the unit of analysis
because we believe that  decisions  about  schooling, especially  for children  in  the
ages  considered here, are made by parents, and that the decisions are made
jointly for all the children in the family (Becker  1981).  For our regression
analysis  we capture  households' schooling  decisions by  defining four  alternative
dependent variables: among families with children aged 8-17, the proportion of
children in each family who were ever enrolled in school; among families with
children aged 13-17  the  proportion of  children in  each family  who completed grade
5  (primary school); among  families with  eligible  children  aged  13-17,  the
proportion of children  who attended post-primary school;  and among families with
eligible children aged 16-17, the proportion who Standard 10.10 The dependent
variables  can thus be interpreted as the probability of school attendance or
completion within families.
We  divide  the  independent  variables  affecting  households'  schooling
decisions into three categories:
(1) Family  characteristics, as  captured by  the number  of children  in
family, proportion of children who are male, father's and mother's education,
whether  the  household  is  part  of  an  extended  or  nuclear  family  living
arrangement,  and average household consumption per adult.  We expect larger
families to  send a smaller  proportion  of their children  to school,  because of the
quantity-quality trade-off that  has been  made by these families;  households with
9 The survey administered two sets  of questionnaires,  one for  households and the
other for villages.  The household questionnaire collected information on the
economic and demographic characteristics of the household and its members, and
detailed  information on the education of children aged 5 to 17  (for example,
enrollment  status,  grade  attained,  expenditure  on  schooling  and  benefits
received).  The village questionnaire solicited information on the availability
of and distance to the nearest schools and other social services.
The Survey  sampled households using a two-stage random sampling procedure
covering  all  districts  in  the State  except Madras.  In  the  first  stage
villages were selected with a probability proportional to their population
size.  The households in the sampled villages were then listed and divided
into two  sub-strata, the first consisting of households with one or more
children enrolled at the  post-primary level, and the second consisting of all
the remaining households.  Three households in  each sub-stratum were randomly
sampled.  In total, the survey covered 2,880  households in  480 villages in all
districts of Tamil Nadu. We ran our regression analyses with each household
unweighted and weighted to take account of its representation in the entire
population. Both methods yielded similar results. Because the interpretation
of weighted results is ambiguous, we present the unweighted results in this
paper.
10  Eligible  children  are  those  who  have  completed  grades  5  and  9,
respectively.
19more boys to send a higher proportion to school, reflecting a well-documented
social bias; parental education to have a positive effect on child education,
since educated parents are more aware of the returns to schooling and more able
to help the child with school work at home; and families with higher levels of
per capita consumption to educate more of their children, because they have the
resources to do so.
(2) Villaqe  characteristics, as  reflected  by  the  average  educational
attainment of men and women in the village, average schooling expense  (fees,
transportation, uniforms, books)  per child,  and proportion  of children  receiving
free  school  meals.  All  these variables,  in  fact,  represent  a mixture  of
exogenous  village  circumstances  and  policy  choices.  For  example,  average
educational attainment in the village is due in part to state policies adopted
20-30 years ago, that may have raised the educational attainment of its current
adult inhabitants.  We expect this  village variable to have  a positive effect on
the family's decision about schooling, because it is likely to determine the
social norm to which individual families  adhere.  High average schooling expense
per  child may  reflect a  lack of  supply of convenient good quality publicly
financed  schools  (a policy  variable  that would  have  a  negative  effect  on
enrollment decisions), but it  may also reflect  a high taste for education in the
village, which would have a positive impact on enrollment decisions.  Since we
do not have instruments to distinguish between these two causes, the net effect
is ambiguous.  Similarly, the proportion of  children receiving  free school
lunches  across  the  state  reflects  the  availability  of  these  lunches,  but
differences across  villages  probably  are  associated  with  students'  socio-economic
status, since lower income students tend to select themselves into the school
lunch program while others eat food supplied by their families.  Therefore the
net  effect  here  is also  ambiguous, although we  expect  the negative  impact
stemming  from the  signal  about  socio-economic  status  to  dominate in  cross-village
analyses.  In  some  regressions we included  average  village  per capita  consumption
expenditure as a regressor instead of adult educational attainment, with which
it is highly correlated.  We also included district dummy variables to capture
the influence of other local characteristics that  may matter, such as religious
composition, per capita income, adult literary rates, general availability of
public services in the community, and so on.
(3)  Government policies, as captured by two variables: distance to the
nearest school and whether the  nearest school  is public.  In contrast to  village
characteristics these variables can be interpreted as  pure policy interventions
reflecting school placement decisions by the government.  Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1994) treat  placement decisions  as endogenous but  limitations in our  data
prevented us from using the same model specification; we therefore follow the
usual practice in the literature by treating them as exogenous variables.  We
expect greater distance to have a negative effect (Duraisamy  and Malathy 1990;
Lavy 1992; King and Lee 1987; Sathar and Llyod 1994)  . Proximity to a public
rather than a private school might lead to higher enrollments because of its
lower  cost  or lower  enrollments  because private  schools  are  perceived as offering
better quality.
In  our  estimations  we  use  generalized  least  squares,  correcting  the
standard errors for  heteroskedasticity  using  Huber-White's  method.  We expect  the
independent variables  to have more explanatory power at the middle and high
school levels, because by 1986-87 most children in the state had some primary
school education.
Results
As  is  common  in  studies  on  school  enrollment  decisions,  family
characteristics  dominate  in explaining  the  variation  households'  schooling
20decisions."  The regression results are consistent with most of our a priori
expectations  (Appendix  Table 1).  Larger families send a smaller proportion of
their children  to school,  especially to  postprimary school. Households with more
boys  send a  higher proportion  of  their children  to school, an  effect  that
intensifies  as  the level of  education under consideration  rises.  Parental
education also  has a  positive effect  on  the  proportion of  children educated; this
effect becomes more  important with rising  levels of  child's education.  As
expected, rising household consumption per adult increases the proportion of
children attending or completing school, and the effect is stronger at higher
than lower levels of education. Since family size has been decreasing while
parental  education  and household consumption have been  increasing, we  would
expect a secular rise over time in enrollment ratios, due to these changing
family circumstances.
With regard to the village-level variables, the education of men has the
expected positive effect on children's education, but the effect materializes
only at the lower levels.  Women's education has a smaller effect-- possibly
because,  in this village-level analysis, women have a more  limited  role in
establishing social norms with regard to children's schooling.  Other village-
level variables have weak effects, possibly because of the ambiguities noted
above.  Among  the  policy  variables,  distance  to  nearest  school  plays  a
significant role  at the  primary level.  Clearly,  proximity to  a school influences
the  enrollment  decision,  so  the  State's policy  of  making  schools  readily
accessible undoubtedly deserves some of the credit for the rising enrollment
ratios.
The R
2 statistic dropped by no more  than 0.03 points  when  the policy
variables  were  excluded  as  independent  variables  in  the  regression
equations.
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22Table 1: Trends in Numbers of Schools and Students and in Gross Enrollment
Ratios in Tamil Nadu, 1977-92
1977  1983  1988  1992
Number of Schools
Primary  27,395  28,546  29,359  30,098
Middle  5,698  5,635  5,707  5,608
High Sch. & Higher Sec.  2,911  3,442  3,819  4,111
Number of Pupils
Primary  4,144,270  4,761,549  5,362,652  5,672,111
Middle  2,436,108  2,715,549  2,980,365  3,117,891
High Sch. & Higher Sec.  1,718,297  2,392,951  3,228,323  4,106,082
Gross Enrollment Ratio a/
Primary  93  98  101  101
Middle  57  69  86  96
High Sch. & Higher Sec.  33  32  40  47
Girls as a Percentage of
All Pupils  44  45  46  46
Primary  43  44  45  45
Middle  38  38  41  42
High Sch. & Higher Sec.
Sources: unpublished administrative records supplied by the Department of
Education, Government of Tamil Nadu, India, supplemented by Govt. of Tamil
Nadu  (1991  and 1994).
Note: Primary education refers to grades 1-5, middle school refers to grades
6-8, high school refers to grades 9-10, and higher secondary school refers
to grades 11-12.  Before 1978-79 higher secondary education did not exist as
a separate cycle but as part of high school.  To maintain comparability in
the time series we show the combined data for high school and higher
secondarv school. In Tamil Nadu schools are categorized according to the
highest grade that they offer. Thus, a school that offers grades 1-10 is
categorized as a high school in Table 1, and all its students are
categorized as high school students.
a/ The gross enrollment ratio is defined as the number of students enrolled
in a given cycle divided by the population in the official age group for the
cycle.  The age groups are 6-11 for primary education, 11-14 for middle
school, 14-16 for high school, and 16-18 for higher secondary school.  The
gross enrollment ratio can exceed 100 percent because the numerator includes
children cutside the age range who either enrolled early or repeated grades.
The ratio for high school and higher secondary school reflects the
population weighted average of the ratios for the two cycles.  We use
different data sources for school enrollments and age enrollment ratios: the
former assigns students to the highest grade offered at the school they
attend (see footnote 3).
23Table  2: Growth  in primary  and middle  school  enrollment  and  teaching  staff
and  pupil-teacher  ratios  by district,  Tamil  Nadu  1977-92
Number  of pupils  and
teachers  in 1992  as  Pupil-teacher  ratio
a multiple  of number  in 1992
District  a/  in 1977
Pupils  Teachers  Absolute  As  multiple
level  of level  in
1977
Madras  1.25  1.09  46.8  1.14
Chengalpattu  1.44  1.05  50.5  1.37
Dharmapuri  1.45  1.10  53.1  1.32
Salem  1.25  1.04  44.8  1.19
Nilgiris  1.41  1.06  44.7  1.33
Pudukottai  1.59  1.23  54.2  1.29
Thiruchirapalli  1.30  1.05  43.9  1.25
Kanniyakumari  1.13  0.95  39.3  1.19
NA Ambedkar-Sambuvaroyar  T.  1.35  0.98  48.7  1.38
SA Vallavar-Villapuram  RP  1.38  1.03  52.1  1.34
Periyar-Coimbatore  1.30  0.97  49.1  1.35
Nagai  QM-Thanjuvar  1.31  1.04  46.5  1.25
Dindigul-Madurai  1.37  1.05  46.2  1.30
Tuticorin-Thirunelveli  1.26  1.07  40.1  1.17
Sivagangai-Kamarajar-  1.41  1.06  48.2  1.33
Ramanadhapuram
STATE  AVERAGE  1.35  1.04  47.0  1.29
Source:  tabulated  from  unpublished  data  provided  by  the Department  of
School  Education,  Government  of Tamil  Nadu.
a/ Data  for  some  districts  have  been  grouped  to create  a  consistent  time
series  since  1977.
24Table  3: Growth  in high  school  and  higher  secondary  school  enrollment  and
teaching  staff  and  pupil-teacher  ratios  by district,  Tamil  Nadu  1980-92
Number  of pupils  and  Pupil-teacher  ratios
teachers  in 1992  as  in 1992
a multiple  of number
District  a/  in 1980




Madras  2.32  1.45  49.3  1.61
Chengalpattu  2.51  1.46  44.5  1.72
Dharmapuri  3.33  1.54  49.6  2.17
Salem  2.30  1.42  40.7  1.62
Nilgiris  2.70  1.57  40.5  1.72
Pudukottai  3.47  1.73  48.2  2.01
Thiruchirapalli  2.24  1.37  38.0  1.64
Kanniyakumari  1.93  1.54  32.2  1.25
NA Ambedkar-Sambuvaroyar  T.  2.74  1.32  44.7  2.07
SA Vallavar-Villapuram  RP  2.50  1.40  43.6  1.78
Periyar-Coimbatore  2.12  1.35  40.7  1.57
Nagai  QM-Thanjuvar  2.15  1.53  38.1  1.41
Dindigul-Madurai  2.24  1.42  40.7  1.58
Tuticorin-Thirunelveli  2.63  1.49  39.7  1.76
Sivagangai-Kamarajar-  2.55  1.50  40.2  1.70
Ramanadhapuram
STATE  AVERAGE  2.39  1.44  41.5  1.66
Source:  tabulated  from  unpublished  data  provided  by  the Department  of
School  Education,  Government  of Tamil  Nadu.
a/ Data  for  some  districts  have  been  grouped  to create  a  consistent  time
series  from  1980.
25Table  4:  Selected  characteristics  of primary  schools  in rural  Tamil  Nadu,
India,  1986/87
Percentage  of  schools  Percentage  of
classes
District  a/
With  one  With  one  Without
room  or  teacher  blackboards  b/
none
Chengalpattu  53.7  11.2  32.0
Dharmapuri  41.7  22.1  39.9
Salem  22.9  13.7  23.7
Nilgiris  10.9  4.1  22.2
Pudukottai  56.5  24.6  40.3
Thiruchirapalli  47.4  9.5  24.9
Kanniyakumari  11.5  0.1  11.5
NA Ambedkar-Sambuvaroya  T.  49.6  8.0  31.5
SA Vallavar-Villapuram  RP  59.3  7.8  34.5
Periyar-Coimbatore  30.9  12.6  19.9
Nagai  QM-Thanjuvar  22.3  4.4  20.4
Dindigul-Madurai  38.1  8.3  14.2
Tuticorin-Thirunelveli  18.3  4.4  10.1
Sivagangai-Kamarajar-  55.7  11.1  15.9
Ramanadhapuram
STATE  AVERAGE  40.4  10.3  24.0
Source:  tabulated  from  unpublished  data  supplied  by  the government  of Tamil
Nadu  from  the  1986/87  Fifth  All-India  Educational  Survey.
a/ Data  for  some  districts  have  been  combined  to correspond  to the  district
groupings  in previous  tables.
b/  Includes  classes  with  unusable  blackboards.
26Table  5: Candidates,  passes  and  pass  rates  on  the  10th  grade
examination,  Tamil  Nadu,  selected  years  1977-92
1977  1986  1989  1992
Number  of  candidates  242,522  314,978  360,832  420,068
Number  of passes  131,677  179,763  207,056  288,203
Passes  as a percentage  of
candidates  54.3  57.1  57.4  68.6
Both  sexes  59.7  61.8  63.3  73.1
Girls
Source:  tabulated  from  unpublished  data  supplied  by  the
Government  of Tamil  Nadu.
27Table  6: Determinants  of the growth  in tenth grade  examination  candidates  and
passes,  Tamil Nadu  1977-92
Number  of Passes  b/  Number  of  Mean  Standard
Candidates  b/  deviation
Number  of Upper  - - .72  *  .83  *  189.4  64.2
enrollments  a,b/  (.09)  (.09)
Number  of  Candidates  b/  1.05  *  .99  *  - - 143.6  46.0
(.09)  (.09)
Middle  school  -1.51  *  -1.22  **  - - 41.8  7.0
pupil/teacher  ratio  for  (.56)  (.52)
each  cohort
Privately-managed  schools  - .22  **  - -. 08  28.0  .16
as a percentage  of all  (.11)  (.15)
schools
Time  c/  2.94  *  3.32  *  -.95  -2.37  *  9.6  5.1
(.57)  (.55)  (.81)  (.78)
Constant  36.71  16.01  -3.30  9.34  - -
District  dummies  yes  no  yes  no  - -
No.  of  Observations  105  90  105  90  - -
Adjusted  R
2 .90  .86  .87  .79  - -
Source:  based  on unpublished  time  series  data provided  by the Department  of School
Education,  Tamil Nadu.
Note:  the figures  in parentheses  are heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors
are in parentheses.  One  star  (*) on the regression  coefficients  denote
statistical  significance  at the 1% level,  and two stars  (**) at the 5% level.
a/ Upper  enrollments  refer to enrollments  in high  school and higher  secondary
school.
b/  Indexed  to base year  1977, with  the data  for 1977 set  at 100.  Because  the
level  variables  (i.e. number  of passes,  candidates,  and enrollments)  are indexed
to a common  base  year  the regression  coefficients  have  a straightforward
interpretation.  For example,  the first  coefficient  in the first  column  indicates
that a one percentage  point  increase  in the number  of candidates  (relative to the
number  in 1977)  leads to a 0.99 percentage  point  increase  in the number  of passes
on the tenth  grade  examination  (relative to 1977).
c/ Number  of years  since base  year  1977.
28Appendix  Table  1: Factors  affecting  households,  decision  to educate  children,  Tamil  Nadu,
India  1986/7
Proportion  of children  in the family with  selected
educational  characteristics
Enrolled  Completed  Enrolled  in  Attended
among  grade  5  post-primary  Standard  10
FamLly  Characteristics  those aged  among  those  school  among  among  those
8-17  aged  13-17  those  aged  aged  16-17
13-17 a/  a/
Number  of children  in the family  -.024  *  -.030 *  -.039  *  -.045 *
(.006)  (.009)  (.010)  (.016)
Boys  as a percentage  of children  in  .138 *  .254 *  .291 *  .284 *
the  family  (.020)  (.022)  (.026)  (.038)
Father's  education  (years)  .018 *  .024 - .028 *  .035 *
(.002)  (.004)  (.004)  (.006)
Mother's  education  (years)  .004 **  .014 *  .015 *  .030 *
(.002)  (.004)  (.004)  (.013)
Family  is part of extended  household  .007  .023  .011  .078
(.023)  (.027)  (.054)  (.069)
Per capita  consumption  expenditure  .190 **  .471 *  .636 *  .479 **-
(10  -3  rupees)  (.076)  (.132)  (.165)  (.286)
Village  characteristics  .012 *  .018 - .005  -.003
Men  (.005)  (.006)  (.008)  (.013)
Adults'  average  years  of  .___  .
education  .003  .017 **  .011  -.018
Women  (.006)  (.007)  (.010)  (.018)
-.002  -.036 **  -
Average  schooling  expenses  Primary  (.032)  (.018)
per  child  (10 -3  rupees) b/
- - .073  *-  .022
Seconda  (.037)  (.074
ry
-.021  .046  - _
Proportion  of children  Primary  (.025)  (.042)
receiving  free school  meals
- - --. 004  -.065
Seconda  (.037)  (.064)
ry
Policy  variables  -.018 *  .006  -
Primary  (.009)  (.008)
nistance  to nearest  school
(km)  _  -. 009 **  .002
Seconda  (.004)  (.005)
ry
Nearest  secondary  school  is public  c/  - - .016  .006
(.035)  (.059)
Constant  .707  .371  .342  .129
District  dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes
Adjusted  R'  .170  .225  .235  .254
Number  of households  1591  1091  1156  488
Source:  based  on data  from the 1986/87 National  Sample  Survey  of Tamil  Nadu,  India.
Note:  figures  in parentheses  are heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors, with  one star
(*) denoting  statistical  significance  at the 1% level,  two stars  (**) at the 5S level,  and
three  stars  (***) at the  10  level.
a/ The denominator  for computing  this variable  includes only  children  who are eligible  for
pozt-primary  or Standard  10 educaticn  by virtue  of having  attended  the previous  level of
education.
b/ Computed  as the average  of reported  expenditures  for children  in each sample  village.
c/ A similar  variable,  "nearest primary  school  is public"  was not used in the first two
regression  because  the nearest  primary  school  in the sample  villages  were  invariably  public
schools.





% Ever enrolled among those aged 8 & over a/  85.71  36.0
% Completed grade 5 among those aged 13-17 a/  62.98  48.29
e  enrolled in post-primary school among those aged 13-17 a/  66.71  47.14
W enrolled in Standard 10 among those aged 16-17 a/  32.11  46.78
Household characteristics
Number of children  2.30  1.16
Boys as a percentage of all children in family  0.56  0.36
Father's education  (years)  3.99  3.97
Mother's education (years)  1.96  3.16
Family is part of extended household  0.12  0.32
Per capita consumption expenditure  (rupees  per month)  181.72
Village characteristics
Men  3.38  2.12
Adult years of education  Women  1.45  1.58
Average schooling expenses per child (rupees  per  Primary  90.29  296.29
year)  Secondary  227.53  214.33
Proportion of children receiving free school meals  Primary
Secondary  0.71  0.35
Policy variables
Distance to nearest school (km)  Primary  0.15  0.86
Secondary  2.57  3.32
Nearest secondary school is public  0.93  0.25
Source: 1986/87 National Sample Survey of Tamil Nadu, India.
30Appendix  Table  3:  Percentage  distribution  of  schools  by management  and  finance,  Tamil
Nadu,  1977-92
Primary  and  middle  High  school  and  higher
school  secondary  school
District
Govt.  Aided  Unaided  Govt.  Aided  Unaided
Madras  60.1  39.8  0.1  33.6  63.9  2.5
Chengalpattu  85.2  14.6  0.2  78.7  20.6  0.7
Dharmapuri  98.6  1.4  0.0  98.3  1.6  0.1
Salem  91.0  8.9  0.1  85.3  14.4  0.3
Nilgiris  68.8  30.1  1.1  71.8  27.6  0.6
Pudukottai  92.8  7.2  0.0  86.0  13.5  0.5
Thiruchirapalli  83.8  16.2  0.0  73.3  26.5  0.2
Kanniyakumari  67.3  32.3  0.4  49.1  49.7  1.2
NA Ambedkar-Sambuvaroya  T.  87.8  12.2  0.0  85.2  13.7  1.1
SA Vallavar-Villapuram  RP  81.8  18.2  0.0  85.9  13.7  0.4
Periyar-Coimbatore  90.2  9.8  0.0  69.9  29.5  0.6
Nagai  QM-Thanjuvar  78.6  21.3  0.1  70.9  28.6  0.5
Dindigul-Madurai  77.0  23.0  0.0  62.4  35.5  2.1
Tuticorin-Thirunelveli  41.8  58.2  0.0  48.9  46.7  4.4
Sivagangai-Kamarajar-  75.7  24.3  0.0  62.7  34.9  2.4
Ramanadhapuram
STATE  AVERAGE  78.7  21.2  0.1  70.8  28.0  1.2
Source:  tabulated  from  unpublished  data  provided  by  the  Department  of School  Education,
Tamil  Nadu.
Note:  the  distribution  remained  relatively  stable  between  1977  and  1992  we present  the
average  distribution  for  the  period.
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